In the setting of secure two-party computation, two mutually distrusting parties wish to compute some function of their inputs while preserving, to the extent possible, various security properties such as privacy, correctness, and more. One desirable property is fairness which guarantees, informally, that if one party receives its output, then the other party does too. Cleve [1986] showed that complete fairness cannot be achieved in general without an honest majority. Since then, the accepted folklore has been that nothing non-trivial can be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting.
INTRODUCTION
In the setting of secure computation, a set of parties wish to run some protocol for computing a function of their inputs while preserving, to the extent possible, security This result is described in Section 3. The round complexity of our protocol in this case is linear in the size of the domains, hence the restriction that the domains be of polynomial size.
Examples of functions without an embedded XOR include Boolean OR and AND, as well as Yao's "millionaires' problem" [Yao 1982 ] (i.e., the greater-than function). We remark that even "simple" functions such as OR/AND are non-trivial in the context of secure two-party computation since they cannot be computed with informationtheoretic privacy [Chor and Kushilevitz 1991] and are in fact complete for two-party secure computation with abort [Kilian 1991] .
Recall that Cleve's result rules out completely fair computation of boolean XOR. Given this and the fact that our first result applies only to functions without an embedded XOR, a natural conjecture is that the presence of an embedded XOR serves as a barrier to completely fair computation of a given function. Our next result shows that this conjecture is false.
THEOREM 1.2. Under suitable cryptographic assumptions, there exist two-input boolean functions containing an embedded XOR that can be securely computed with complete fairness.
This result is described in Section 4. The round complexity of the protocol here is super-logarithmic in the security parameter. We show that this is, in fact, inherent.
THEOREM 1.3. Let f be a two-input function containing an embedded XOR. Then any protocol securely computing f with complete fairness (if one exists) requires ω(log n) rounds.
Our proof of this theorem is reminiscent of Cleve's proof [Cleve 1986 ], except that Cleve only needed to consider the adversary's ability to bias a coin toss, whereas we must jointly consider both bias and privacy (since, for certain functions containing an embedded XOR, it is possible for an adversary to bias the output even in the ideal world). This makes the proof considerably more complex.
Related Work
Questions of fairness have been studied since the early days of secure computation. Previous work has been dedicated to achieving various relaxations of fairness (i.e., "partial fairness"), both for the case of specific functionalities like coin tossing [Beimel et al. 2010; Cleve 1986 Cleve , 1990 Moran et al. 2009 ] and contract signing/exchanging secrets [Ben-Or et al. 1990; Blum 1983; Even et al. 1985; Damgård 1995; Luby et al. 1983] , as well as for the case of general functionalities [Beaver and Goldwasser 1989; Beimel et al. 2011; Boneh and Naor 2000; Galil et al. 1988; Garay et al. 2011; Goldwasser and Levin 1991; Gordon and Katz 2010; Ishai et al. 2011; Pinkas 2003 ]; see Gordon [2010] for a survey. Such work is tangential to our own: here, rather than try to achieve partial fairness for all (or a broad class of) functionalities, we are interested in understanding when complete fairness is possible for specific functionalities.
Open Questions
We have shown the first positive results for completely fair secure computation of nontrivial functionalities without an honest majority. This re-opens an area of research that was previously thought to be closed, and leaves many tantalizing open directions to explore. The most pressing question left open by this work is to provide a tight 24:4 S. D. Gordon et al. characterization of which boolean functions can be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting. More generally, the positive results shown here apply only to deterministic, single-output, 3 Boolean functions defined over polynomial-size domains. Relaxing any of these restrictions in a nontrivial way (or proving the impossibility of doing so) would be an interesting next step. Finally, what can be said with regard to complete fairness in the multi-party setting without honest majority? (This question is interesting both with and without the assumption of a broadcast channel). Initial feasibility results have been shown [Gordon and Katz 2009] , but much work remains to be done.
DEFINITIONS
We let n denote the security parameter. A function μ(·) is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large n it holds that μ(n) < 1/ p(n). A distribution ensemble X = {X (a, n)} a∈D n , n∈N is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by a ∈ D n and n ∈ N, where D n is a set that may depend on n. (Looking ahead, n will be the security parameter and D n will denote the domain of the parties' inputs.) Two distribution ensembles X = {X (a, n)} a∈D n , n∈N and Y = {Y (a, n)} a∈D n , n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X 
Pr[D(X (a, n)) = 1] − Pr[D(Y (a, n)) = 1] ≤ μ(n).
The statistical difference between two distributions X (a, n) and Y (a, n) is defined as
where the sum ranges over s in the support of either X (a, n) or Y (a, n). Two distribution ensembles X = {X (a, n)} a∈D n , n∈N and Y = {Y (a, n)} a∈D n , n∈N are statistically indistinguishable, denoted X s ≡ Y , if there is a negligible function μ(·) such that for every n and every a ∈ D n , it holds that SD X (a, n), Y (a, n) ≤ μ(n).
Functionalities. In the two-party setting, a functionality F = { f n } n∈N is a sequence of randomized processes, where each f n maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We write f n = ( f 1 n , f 2 n ) if we wish to emphasize the two outputs of f n , but stress that if f 1 n and f 2 n are randomized then the outputs of f 1 n and f 2 n are correlated random variables. The domain of f n is X n × Y n , where X n (respectively, Y n ) denotes the possible inputs of the first (respectively, second) party. 4 If |X n | and |Y n | are polynomial in n, then we say that F is defined over polynomial-size domains. If each f n is deterministic we will refer to each f n as well as the collection F , as a function.
Secure Two-Party Computation with Complete Fairness
In what follows, we define what we mean by a secure protocol. Our definition follows the standard definition of Goldreich [2004] (based on Goldwasser and Levin [1991] , Micali and Rogaway [1992] , Beaver [1992] , and Canetti [2000] ) except that we require complete fairness even though we are in the two-party setting. (Thus, our definition is equivalent to the one in Goldreich [2004] for the case of an honest majority, even
Complete Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation 24:5 though we do not have an honest majority). We consider active (i.e., malicious) adversaries who may deviate from the protocol arbitrarily, and static corruptions.
Two-Party Computation.
A two-party protocol for computing a functionality F = {( f 1 n , f 2 n )} is a protocol running in polynomial time and satisfying the following functional requirement: if party P 1 begins by holding 1 n and input x ∈ X n , and party P 2 holds 1 n and input y ∈ Y n , then the joint distribution of the outputs of the parties is statistically close to ( f
Security of Protocols (Informal) . The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in a real protocol execution to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted party exists) can do no more harm than if it were involved in the previously described ideal computation.
We assume an adversary who corrupts one of the parties. It is also meaningful to consider an eavesdropping adversary who corrupts neither of the parties (and should learn nothing from the execution), but such an adversary is easily handled and is not very interesting in our setting.
Execution in the Ideal Model. The parties are P 1 and P 2 , and there is an adversary A who has corrupted one of them. An ideal execution for the computation of F = { f n } proceeds as follows.
Inputs. P 1 and P 2 hold the same value 1 n , and their inputs x ∈ X n and y ∈ Y n , respectively; the adversary A receives an auxiliary input z. Send Inputs to Trusted Party. The honest party sends its input to the trusted party. The corrupted party controlled by A may send any value of its choice. Denote the pair of inputs sent to the trusted party by (x , y ). Trusted Party Sends Outputs. If x ∈ X n , the trusted party sets x to some default input in X n ; likewise if y ∈ Y n the trusted party sets y equal to some default input in Y n . Then the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random and sends f 1 n (x , y ; r) to party P 1 and f 2 n (x , y ; r) to party P 2 . Outputs. The honest party outputs whatever it was sent by the trusted party, the corrupted party outputs nothing, and A outputs an arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its view.
We let IDEAL F ,A(z) (x, y, n) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adversary and the output of the honest party following an execution in the ideal model as described previously.
Execution in the Real Model. We next consider the real model in which a two-party protocol π is executed by P 1 and P 2 (and there is no trusted party). In this case, the adversary A gets the inputs of the corrupted party and sends all messages on behalf of this party, using an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. The honest party follows the instructions of π.
Let F be as previously described and let π be a two-party protocol computing F . Let A be a nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input z. We let REAL π,A(z) (x, y, n) be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the honest party, following an execution of π where P 1 begins by holding 1 n and input x and P 2 begins by holding 1 n and y. 
Security as Emulation of an Ideal Execution in the Real Model.
Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of a protocol. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated as follows:
Definition 2.1. Protocol π is said to securely compute F with complete fairness if for every nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that the following distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
Secure Two-Party Computation with Abort
This definition is the standard one for secure two-party computation [Goldreich 2004] in that it allows early abort; that is, the adversary may receive its own output even though the honest party does not. (We include this definition since we use it when analyzing our completely fair protocols.) We again let P 1 and P 2 denote the two parties, and consider an adversary A who has corrupted one of them. The only change from the definition in Section 2.1 is with regard to the ideal model for computing F = { f n }, which is now defined as follows.
Inputs. As previously.
Send inputs to trusted party. As previously. Trusted party sends output to corrupted party. If x ∈ X n the trusted party sets x to some default input in X n ; likewise if y ∈ Y n the trusted party sets y equal to some default input in Y n . Then the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random, computes z 1 = f 1 n (x , y ; r) and z 2 = f 2 n (x , y ; r), and sends z i to the corrupted party P i (i.e., to the adversary A). Adversary decides whether to abort. After receiving its output (as previously described), the adversary either sends abort of continue to the trusted party. In the former case, the trusted party sends ⊥ to the honest party P j , and in the latter case, the trusted party sends z j to P j . Outputs. As previously.
We let IDEAL abort F ,A(z) (x, y, n) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adversary and the output of the honest party following an execution in the ideal model as described in this article.
Definition 2.2. Protocol π is said to securely compute F with abort if for every nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that the following distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
The Hybrid Model
The hybrid model combines both the real and ideal models. Specifically, an execution of a protocol π in the G-hybrid model, for some functionality G, involves the parties sending normal messages to each other (as in the real model) and, in addition, having access to a trusted party computing G. The parties communicate with this trusted party in exactly the same way as in the ideal models described previously; the question of which ideal model is taken (that with or without abort) must be specified. In this article, we always consider a hybrid model where the functionality G is computed according to the ideal model with abort. In all our protocols in the G-hybrid model, there will only be sequential calls to G; that is, there is at most a single call to G per round, and no other messages are sent during any round in which G is called.
Let G be a functionality and let π be a two-party protocol for computing some functionality F , where π includes real messages between the parties as well as calls to G. Let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input z. We let HYBRID G π,A(z) (x, y, n) be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the honest party, following an execution of π (with ideal calls to G) where P 1 begins by holding 1 n and input x and P 2 begins by holding 1 n and input y. Both security with complete fairness and security with abort can be defined via the natural modifications of Definitions 2.1 and 2.2.
The hybrid model gives a powerful tool for proving the security of protocols. Specifically, we may design a real-world protocol for securely computing some functionality F by first constructing a protocol for computing F in the G-hybrid model. Letting π denote the protocol thus constructed (in the G-hybrid model), we denote by π ρ the realworld protocol in which calls to G are replaced by sequential execution of a real-world protocol ρ that computes G. ("Sequential" here implies that only one execution of ρ is carried out at any time, and no other π-protocol messages are sent during execution of ρ.) The results of Canetti [2000] 
Information-Theoretic MACs
We briefly review the standard definition for information-theoretically secure message authentication codes (MACs). (We use such MACs for simplicity, though computationally secure MACs would also suffice.) A message authentication code consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Mac, Vrfy). The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1 n in unary and outputs a key k. The message authentication algorithm Mac takes as input a key k and a message M ∈ {0, 1} ≤n , and outputs a tag t; we write this as t = Mac k (M). The verification algorithm Vrfy takes as input a key k, a message M ∈ {0, 1} ≤n , and a tag t, and outputs a bit b ; we write this as b = Vrfy k (M, t). We regard b = 1 as acceptance and b = 0 as rejection, and require that for all n, all k output by Gen(1 n ), all M ∈ {0, 1} ≤n , it holds that Vrfy k (M, Mac k (M)) = 1. We say (Gen, Mac, Vrfy) is a secure m-time MAC, where m may be a function of n, if no computationally unbounded adversary can output a valid tag on a new message after seeing valid tags on m other messages. For our purposes, we do not require security against an adversary who adaptively chooses its m messages for which to obtain a valid tag; it suffices to consider a non-adaptive definition where the m messages are fixed in advance. (Nevertheless, known constructions satisfy the stronger requirement.) Formally, we have Definition 2.4. 
FAIR COMPUTATION OF THE MILLIONAIRES' PROBLEM (AND MORE)
In this section, we describe a protocol for securely computing the millionaires' problem (and related functionalities) with complete fairness. (We discuss in Section 3.2 how this generalizes, rather easily, to any function over polynomial-size domains that does not contain an embedded XOR.) Specifically, we look at functions defined by a lowertriangular matrix, as in the following table: 
Viewed in this way, f m is exactly the millionaires' problem or, equivalently, the "greater-than" function. The remainder of this section is devoted to a proof of the following theorem. Constant-round protocols for secure two-party computation with abort can be constructed based on enhanced trapdoor permutations or any constant-round oblivioustransfer protocol [Lindell 2003 ]. (The assumption of a constant-round protocol is needed only for the claim regarding round complexity.) The fact that our protocol requires (m) rounds explains why we require m = poly(n). When m = 2, we obtain a constant-round protocol for computing Boolean AND with complete fairness and, by symmetry, a protocol for Boolean OR. Our results extend to variants of f m such as the "greater-than-or-equal-to" function, or the "greater-than" function where the sizes of the domains X and Y are unequal; see Section 3.2 for a full discussion.
The Protocol
In this section, we write f in place of f m , and X and Y in place of X m and Y m . Intuition. At a high level, our protocol works as follows. Say the input of P 1 is x i , and the input of P 2 is y j . Following a constant-round "preprocessing" phase, the protocol proceeds in a series of m iterations, where P 1 learns the output-namely, the value f (x i , y j )-in iteration i, and P 2 learns the output in iteration j. (I.e., in contrast to standard protocols, the iteration in which a party learns the output depends on the value of its own input). If one party (say, P 1 ) aborts after receiving its iteration-k message, and the second party (say, P 2 ) has not yet received its output, then P 2 "assumes" that P 1 learned its output in iteration k, and so computes f on its own using input x k for P 1 . (In this case, that means that P 2 would output f (x k , y j ).) We stress that a malicious P 1 may, of course, abort in any iteration it likes (and not necessarily in the iteration in which it learns its output); the foregoing is only an intuitive explanation.
That this approach gives complete fairness can be understood intuitively as follows. Say P 1 is malicious and uses x i as its effective input, and let y denote the (unknown) input of P 2 . There are two possibilities: P 1 either aborts in iteration k < i, or iteration k ≥ i. (If P 1 never aborts then fairness is trivially achieved.) In the first case, P 1 never learns the correct output and so fairness is achieved. In the second case, P 1 does obtain the output f (x i , y) (in iteration i) and then aborts in some iteration k ≥ i. Here we consider two subcases depending on the value of P 2 's input y = y j .
-If j < k, then P 2 has already received its output in a previous iteration and fairness is achieved.
has not yet received its output. Since P 1 aborts in iteration k,
relying on the specifics of f ), and so the output of P 2 is equal to the output obtained by P 1 (and thus fairness is achieved). This is the key observation that enables us to obtain fairness for this function.
We formalize this intuition in our proof, where we demonstrate an ideal-world simulator corresponding to the actions of any malicious P 1 . Of course, we also consider the case of a malicious P 2 .
Formal Description of the Protocol. We use a message authentication code (Gen, Mac, Vrfy); see Definition 2.4. For convenience, we use an m-time message authentication code (MAC) with information-theoretic security, though a computationally secure MAC would also suffice.
We also rely on a subprotocol for securely computing a randomized functionality ShareGen defined in Figure 1 . In our protocol, the parties will compute ShareGen as a result of which P 1 will obtain shares a
2 , . . . and P 2 will obtain shares a
. (The functionality
ShareGen also provides the parties with MAC keys and tags so that if a malicious party modifies the share it sends to the other party, then the other party will almost certainly detect this. In case such manipulation is detected, it will be treated as an abort.) The parties then exchange their shares oneby-one in a sequence of m iterations. Specifically, in iteration i party P 2 will send a (2) i to P 1 , thus allowing P 1 to reconstruct the value a i
i , and then P 1 will send b
(1) i to P 2 , thus allowing P 2 to learn the value b i
Let π be a protocol that securely computes ShareGen with abort. Our protocol for computing f with complete fairness uses π and is given in Figure 2 . securely compute ShareGen with abort, the adversary in the hybrid model is allowed to abort the trusted party computing ShareGen before output is sent to the honest party.) We prove that an execution of in this hybrid model is statistically close to an evaluation of f in the ideal model (with complete fairness), where the only difference occurs due to MAC forgeries. Applying Proposition 2.3 then implies the theorem.
We separately analyze corruption of P 1 and P 2 , beginning with P 1 . 
CLAIM 1. For every nonuniform, polynomial-time adversary
PROOF. Let P 1 be corrupted by A. We construct a simulator S given black-box access to A.
(1) S invokes A on the input x, the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter n.
(2) S receives the input x of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen.
(a) If x / ∈ X (this includes the case when x = ⊥ since A aborts), then S hands ⊥ to A as its output from the computation of ShareGen, sends x 1 to the trusted party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. (b) Otherwise, if the input is some x ∈ X , then S chooses uniformly distributed shares a
m and b strings a
, and k a as its output from the computation of ShareGen. (3) If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGen (signalling that P 2 should receive ⊥ as output from ShareGen), then S sends x 1 to the trusted party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. Otherwise (i.e., if A sends continue), S proceeds as follows. (4) Let i (with 1 ≤ i ≤ m) be the index such that x = x i (such an i exists since x ∈ X ). (5) To simulate iteration j, for j < i, simulator S works as follows:
= NULL, and computes the tag t
(or the message is invalid, or A aborts), then S sends x j to the trusted party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
, then S proceeds to the next iteration. (6) To simulate iteration i, simulator S works as follows:
(a) S sends x i to the trusted party computing f , and receives back the We analyze the simulator S described previously. In what follows, we assume that, if
j (meaning that A sent the same share that it received). Under this assumption, we show that the distribution generated by S is identical to the distribution in a hybrid execution between A and an honest P 2 . Since this assumption holds with all but negligible probability (by security of the informationtheoretic MAC), this proves statistical closeness as stated in the claim.
Let y denote the input of P 2 . It is clear that the view of A in an execution with S is identical to the view of A in a hybrid execution with P 2 ; the only difference is that the initial shares given to A are generated by S without knowledge of z = f (x , y), but since these shares are uniformly distributed the view of A is unaffected. Therefore, what is left to demonstrate is that the joint distribution of A's view and P 2 's output is identical in the hybrid world and the ideal world. We show this now by separately considering three different cases.
(1) Case 1. S sends x 1 to the trusted party because x ∈ X , or because A aborted the computation of ShareGen. In the hybrid world, P 2 would have received ⊥ from ShareGen, and would have then output f (x 1 , y) as instructed by protocol . This is exactly what P 2 outputs in the ideal execution with S because, in this case, S sends x 1 to the trusted party computing f . If Case 1 does not occur, let x i be defined as in the description of the simulator. (2) Case 2. S sends x j to the trusted party, for some j < i. This case occurs when A aborts the protocol in some iteration j < i (either by refusing to send a message, sending an invalid message, or sending an incorrect share). There are two subcases depending on the value of P 2 's input y. Let be the index such that y = y . Then: (a) If ≥ j, then, in the hybrid world, P 2 would not yet have determined its output (since it only determines its output once it receives a valid message from P 1 in iteration ). Thus, as instructed by the protocol, P 2 would output f (x j , y). This is exactly what P 2 outputs in the ideal world, because S sends x j to the trusted party in this case. (b) If < j, then, in the hybrid world, P 2 would have already determined its output f (x , y) = f (x i , y ) in the th iteration. In the ideal world, P 2 will output f (x j , y ) since S sends x j to the trusted party. Since j < i, we have < j < i and so 
, exactly as in the ideal world.
(ii) A sends an incorrect share in iteration ζ , where i ≤ ζ ≤ . In this case, by the specification of the protocol, party
Thus, P 2 outputs the same value in the hybrid and ideal executions.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
The following claim, dealing with a corrupted P 2 , completes the proof of the theorem.
CLAIM 2. For every nonuniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P 2 and running in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort), there exists a nonuniform, probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P 2 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing f (with complete fairness), such that the following distribution ensembles are statistically indistinguishable:
PROOF. Say P 2 is corrupted by A. We construct a simulator S given black-box access to A.
(1) S invokes A on the input y, the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter n. (2) S receives the input y of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen.
(a) If y / ∈ Y (this includes the case when y = ⊥ since A aborts), then S hands ⊥ to A as its output from the computation of ShareGen, sends y 1 to the trusted party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. (b) Otherwise, if the input is some y ∈ Y , then S chooses uniformly distributed shares a
m and b 
= z, and compute the tag t
j ,t a j ) = 0 (or the message is invalid, or A aborts), then S outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If
(8) If S has not halted yet, at this point it halts and outputs whatever A outputs.
As in the proof of the previous claim, we assume in what follows that if
j (meaning that A sent P 1 the same share that it received). Under this assumption, we show that the distribution generated by S is identical to the distribution in a hybrid execution between A and an honest P 1 . Since this assumptions holds with all but negligible probability (by security of the MAC), this proves statistical closeness as stated in the claim.
Let x denote the input of P 1 . Again, it is clear that the view of A in an execution with S is identical to the view of A in a hybrid execution with P 1 . What is left to demonstrate is that the joint distribution of A's view and P 1 's output is identical. We show this by considering four different cases.
(1) Case 1. S sends y 1 to the trusted party because y ∈ Y , or because A aborted the computation of ShareGen. In such a case, the protocol instructs P 1 to output f (x, y 1 ), exactly what P 1 outputs in the ideal world. (2) Case 2. S sends y 1 to the trusted party because A sends an incorrect share in the first iteration. In this case, the simulator sends y 1 to the trusted party computing f , and so the output of P 1 in the ideal world is f (x, y 1 ). In the hybrid world, P 1 will also output f (x, y 1 ) as instructed by the protocol. If Cases 1 and 2 do not occur, let y i be defined as in the description of the simulator. (3) Case 3. S sends y j−1 to the trusted party, for some 1 ≤ j − 1 < i, because A sends an incorrect share in the jth iteration: The output of P 1 in the ideal world is f (x, y j−1 ). There are two subcases here, depending on the value of P 1 's input x. Let be the index such that x = x . Then: . . . , (inclusive) . This implies that, in the hybrid world, P 1 would determine its output to be a (1) ⊕ a (2) = f (x, y ) = f (x, y i ), exactly as in the ideal execution.
(ii) A sends an incorrect share in iteration ζ , where i < ζ ≤ . In this case, by the specification of the protocol, party P 1 would output f (x, y ζ −1 ) = f (x , y ζ −1 ) in the hybrid world. But since i ≤ ζ − 1 < we have f (x , y ζ −1 ) = 1 = f (x , y i ), and so P 1 's output is identical in both the hybrid and ideal worlds.
This completes the proof of the claim.
The preceding claims along with Proposition 2.3 imply the theorem.
Handling any Function without an Embedded XOR
The protocol in the previous section, as described, applies only to the "greater-than" function on two equal-size domains X and Y . For the case of the greater-than function with |X | = |Y | + 1, the same protocol (with one small change) still works. Specifically, let X = {x 1 , . . . , x m+1 } and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y m } with f still defined as in Eq. (1). Modify the protocol of Figure 2 so that if the end of the protocol is reached and P 1 holds input x m+1 , then P 1 outputs 1. Then, the same proof as in the previous section shows that this protocol is also completely fair. (Adapting Claim 2 is immediate: the view of a malicious P 2 is simulated in the same way; as for the output of the honest P 1 , the case when P 1 holds input x = x i with i < m + 1 is analyzed identically, and when x = x m+1 , then P 1 outputs 1 no matter what in both the hybrid and ideal worlds. Adapting Claim 1 requires only a little thought to verify that the analysis in Case 2(b) still holds when i = m + 1.) We now show that the protocol can be applied to any function defined over polynomial-size domains that does not contain an embedded XOR. This is because any such function can be "converted" to the greater-than function as we now describe.
Let g : X × Y → {0, 1} be a function that does not contain an embedded XOR, and let X = {x 1 , . . . , x m 1 } and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y m 2 }. It will be convenient to picture g as an m 1 × m 2 matrix, where entry (i, j) contains the value g(x i , y j ). Similarly, we can view any matrix as a function.
We will apply a sequence of transformations to g that will result in a "functionally equivalent" function g , where by "functionally equivalent" we mean that g can be computed with perfect security (and complete fairness) in the g -hybrid model (where g is computed by a trusted party with complete fairness). It follows that a secure and completely fair protocol for computing g yields a secure and completely fair protocol for computing g. The transformations are as follows.
(1) First, remove any duplicate rows or columns in g (e.g., if there exist i and i such that g(x i , y) = g(x i , y) for all y ∈ Y , then remove either row i or row i ). Denote the resulting function by g , and say that g (viewed as a matrix) has dimension m 1 × m 2 . It is clear that g is functionally equivalent to g. (2) We observe that no two rows (respectively, columns) of g have the same Hamming weight. To see this, notice that two nonidentical rows (respectively, columns) with the same Hamming weight would imply the existence of an embedded XOR in g , and hence an embedded XOR in g.
Since the maximum Hamming weight of any row is m 2 , this implies that m 1 ≤ m 2 + 1. Applying the same argument to the columns shows that m 2 ≤ m 1 + 1, and so the number of rows is within 1 of the number of columns. Assume m 1 ≥ m 2 ; if not, we may simply take the transpose of g (which just has the effect of swapping the roles of the parties). (3) Order the rows of g in increasing order according to their Hamming weight. Order the columns in the same way. Once again this results in a function g that is functionally equivalent to g (and hence to g).
All of these transformations are efficiently computable since we are assuming that the initial domains X and Y are of polynomial size. Given g resulting from the preceding transformations, there are now three possibilities (recall we assume that the number of rows is at least the number of columns).
(1) Case 1. m 1 = m 2 + 1. In this case the first row of g is an all-0 row and the last row is an all-1 row, and we exactly have an instance of the greater-than function with m 1 = m 2 + 1. (2) Case 2. m 1 = m 2 and the first row of g is an all-0 row. Then we again have an instance of the greater-than function, except now with equal-size domains. (3) Case 3. m 1 = m 2 and the first row of g is not an all-0 row. In this case, the last row of g must be an all-1 row. Taking the complement of every bit in the matrix (and then re-ordering the rows and columns accordingly) gives a function that is still functionally equivalent to g and is exactly an instance of the greater-than function on equal-size domains.
We have thus proved the following. The assumption in the theorem is minimal, since the existence of even a securewith-abort protocol for computing boolean OR implies the existence of oblivious transfer Kilian [1991] , which in turn suffices for constructing a secure-with-abort protocol for any polynomial-time functionality Kilian [1988] .
FAIR COMPUTATION OF FUNCTIONS WITH AN EMBEDDED XOR
Recall that Cleve's result showing impossibility of completely fair coin tossing implies the impossibility of completely fair computation of Boolean XOR. (More generally, it implies the impossibility of completely fair computation of any function f that enables coin tossing: that is, any f such that a completely fair implementation of f suffices for coin tossing). Given this, along with the fact that our result in the previous section applies only to functions that do not contain an embedded XOR, it is tempting to conjecture that no function containing an embedded XOR can be computed with complete fairness. In this section, we show that this is not the case and that there exist functions with an embedded XOR that can be computed with complete fairness. Interestingly, however, such functions appear to be "more difficult" to compute with complete fairness; specifically, we refer the reader to Section 5 where we prove a lower bound of ω(log n) on the round complexity of any protocol for completely fair computation of any function having an embedded XOR. (Note that, in general, this bound is incomparable to the result of the previous section, where the round complexity was linear in the domain size.)
It will be instructive to see why Cleve's impossibility result does not immediately rule out complete fairness for all functions containing an embedded XOR. Consider the following function f (for which we will later prove feasibility):
If the parties could be forced to choose their inputs from {x 1 , x 2 } and {y 1 , y 2 }, respectively, then it would be easy to generate a fair coin toss from any secure computation of f (with complete fairness) by simply instructing both parties to choose their inputs uniformly from the stated domains. (This results in a fair coin toss since the output is uniform at long as either party chooses their input at random.) Unfortunately, a protocol for securely computing f does not restrict the first party to choosing its input in {x 1 , x 2 }, and cannot prevent that party from choosing input x 3 and thus biasing the result toward 1 with certainty. (Naive solutions such as requiring the first party to provide a zero-knowledge proof that it chose its input in {x 1 , x 2 } do not work either, since we still need a way for, for example, the second party to decide on their output in case the zero-knowledge proof of the first party fails). Of course, this only shows that Cleve's impossibility result does not apply but does not prove that a completely fair protocol for computing f exists.
The Protocol
Preliminaries. In this section, we present a generic protocol for computing a Boolean function F = { f n : X n × Y n → {0, 1}}. (For convenience, we write X and Y and drop the explicit dependence on n in what follows.) The protocol is parameterized by a function α = α(n), and the number of rounds is set to m = ω(α −1 log n) in order for correctness to hold with all but negligible probability. (We thus must have α noticeable to ensure that the number of rounds is polynomial in n).
We do not claim that the protocol is completely fair for arbitrary functions F and arbitrary settings of α. Rather, we claim that for some functions F there exists a corresponding α for which the protocol is completely fair. In Section 4.2, we prove this for one specific function that contains an embedded XOR. The ideas in that proof can be generalized to show that the protocol can be used for completely fair computation of other functions as well [Gordon et al. 2008 ]. 
Overview and Intuition.
As in the protocol of the previous section, the parties begin by running a "preliminary" phase during which values a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a m , b m are generated based on the parties' respective inputs x and y, and shares of the {a i , b i } are distributed to each of the parties. (As before, this phase will be carried out using a standard protocol for secure two-party computation, where one party can abort the execution and prevent the other party from receiving any output.) As in the previous protocol, following the preliminary phase the parties exchange their shares one-by-one in a sequence of m iterations, with P 1 reconstructing a i and P 2 reconstructing b i in iteration i. At the end of the protocol, P 1 outputs a m and P 2 outputs b m . If a party (say, P 1 ) ever aborts, then the other party (P 2 in this case) outputs the last value it successfully reconstructed; that is, if P 1 aborts before sending its iteration-i message, P 2 outputs b i−1 . (This assumes i > 1. See the formal description of the protocol for further details.)
In contrast to our earlier protocol, however, the values a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a m , b m are now generated probabilistically in the following way: first, a value i * ∈ {1, . . . , m} is chosen according to a geometric distribution with parameter α (see following), in a way such that neither party learns the value of i * . For i < i * , the value a i (respectively, b i ) is chosen in a manner that is independent of P 2 's (respectively, P 1 's) input; specifically, we set a i = f (x,ŷ) for randomly chosenŷ ∈ Y (and analogously for b i ). For all i ≥ i * , the values a i and b i are set equal to f (x, y). Note that if m = ω(α −1 log n), we have a m = b m = f (x, y) with all but negligible probability and so correctness holds. (The protocol could also be modified so that a m = b m = f (x, y) with probability 1, thus giving perfect correctness. But the analysis is easier without this modification.)
Fairness is more difficult to see and, of course, cannot hold for all functions f since some functions cannot be computed fairly. But as intuition for why the protocol achieves fairness for certain functions, we observe that: (1) if a malicious party (say, P 1 ) aborts in some iteration i < i * , then P 1 has not yet obtained any information about P 2 's input and so fairness is trivially achieved. On the other hand, (2) if P 1 aborts in some iteration i > i * , then both P 1 and P 2 have received the correct output f (x, y) and fairness is obtained. The worst case, then, occurs when P 1 aborts exactly in iteration i * , as P 1 has then learned the correct value of f (x, y) while P 2 has not. However, P 1 cannot identify iteration i * with certainty, even if it knows the other party's input y! This is because P 1 can randomly receive the correct output value even in rounds i < i * . Although the adversary may happen to guess i * correctly, the fact that it can never be sure whether its guess is correct is what allows us to prove fairness. (Recall, we define fairness via indistinguishability from an ideal world in which fairness is guaranteed. This intuition provides a way of understanding what is going on, but the formal proof does not exactly follow this intuition).
Formal Description of the Protocol. The protocol is parameterized by a value α = α(n) which is assumed to be noticeable. Let m = ω(α −1 log n). As in the previous section, we use an m-time MAC with information-theoretic security. We also rely on a sub-protocol π computing a functionality ShareGen that generates shares (and associated MAC tags) for the parties; see Figure 3 . (As before, π securely computes ShareGen with abort.) We continue to let a
2 , . . . denote the shares obtained by P 1 , and let a
2 , . . . denote the shares obtained by P 2 . Functionality ShareGen generates a value i * according to a geometric distribution with parameter α. This is the probability distribution on N = {1, 2, . . .} given by repeating a Bernoulli trial (with parameter α) until the first success. In other words, i * is determined by tossing a biased coin (i.e., heads with probability α) until the first head appears, and letting i * be the number of tosses performed. Note that neither party learns the value of i * . We use a geometric distribution for i * because it has the following useful property: for any i, the probability that i
. We remark that, as far as ShareGen is concerned, if i * > m then the exact value of i * is unimportant, and so ShareGen can be implemented in strict (rather than expected) polynomial time. In any case, our choice of m ensures that i * ≤ m with all but negligible probability.
Our second protocol calls ShareGen as a subroutine and then has the parties exchange their shares as in our first protocol. As discussed previously, aborts are handled differently here in that a party also outputs the last value it reconstructed if the other party aborts. A formal description of the protocol is given in Figure 4. 
Proof of Security for a Particular Function
Protocol 2 cannot guarantee complete fairness for all functions f . Rather, what we claim is that for certain functions f and particular associated values of α, the protocol provides complete fairness. In this section, we prove security for the following function f :
This function has an embedded XOR, and is defined over a finite domain so that X n = X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and Y n = Y = {y 1 , y 2 }. For this f , we set α = 1/5 in Protocol 2. Figure 4 with α = 1/5. We analyze in a hybrid model where there is a trusted party computing ShareGen . (One again, we stress that since π is only guaranteed to securely compute ShareGen with abort, the adversary is allowed to abort the trusted party computing ShareGen before it sends output to the honest party.) We will prove that an execution of Protocol 2 in this hybrid model is statistically close to an evaluation of f in the ideal model with complete fairness, where the only differences can occur due to MAC forgeries. Applying Proposition 2.3 then implies the theorem.
PROOF. Let denote the protocol in
In the two claims that follow, we separately analyze corruption of P 2 and P 1 . The case of a corrupted P 2 is relatively easy to analyze since P 1 always "gets the output first" (because, in every iteration-and iteration i * in particular-P 2 sends its share first). The proof of security when P 1 is corrupted is much more challenging, and is given second. PROOF. Let P 2 be corrupted by A. We construct a simulator S given black-box access to A.
CLAIM 3. For every nonuniform, polynomial-time adversary
(1) S invokes A on the input y, the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter n.
The simulator also choosesŷ ∈ Y uniformly at random. (It will sendŷ to the trusted party, if needed.) (2) S receives the input y of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen .
(a) If y / ∈ Y (this includes the case when y = ⊥ since A aborts), then S hands ⊥ to A as its output from the computation of ShareGen and sendsŷ to the trusted party computing f . It then halts and outputs whatever A outputs. We assume that if
(meaning that A sent the same share that it received). It is straightforward to prove that this is the case with all but negligible probability based on the information-theoretic security of the MAC. Under this assumption, the distribution generated by S in an ideal-world execution with a trusted party computing f is identical to the distribution in a hybrid execution between A and an honest P 1 . To see this, first note that the view of A is identical in both worlds. As for the output of P 1 , if A aborts (or sends an invalid message) before sending its first-iteration message, then P 1 outputs f (x,ŷ) for a randomŷ ∈ Y in both the hybrid and ideal worlds. If A aborts after sending a valid iteration-i message, then, conditioned on A's view at that point, the distribution of i * is identical in the hybrid and ideal worlds. Moreover, in both worlds, P 1 outputs f (x,ŷ) (for a randomŷ ∈ Y ) if i < i * and outputs f (x, y ) if i ≥ i * . This concludes the proof of this case.
We remark that the proof of the preceding claim did not depend on the value of α or the particular function f . The value of α and the specific nature of f will become important when we deal with a malicious P 1 in the proof of the following claim.
CLAIM 4. For every nonuniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P 1 and running in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort), there exists a nonuniform, probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P 1 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing f (with complete fairness), such that
PROOF. Say P 1 is corrupted by an adversary A. We construct a simulator S that is given black-box access to A. For readability in what follows, we ignore the presence of the MAC-tags and keys. That is, we do not mention the fact that S computes MAC-tags for messages it gives to A, nor do we mention the fact that S must verify the MAC-tags on the messages sent by A. When we say that A "aborts", we include in this the event that A sends an invalid message, or a message whose tag does not pass verification.
(1) S invokes A on the input 6 x , auxiliary input z, and the security parameter n. The simulator also choosesx ∈ X uniformly at random (it will sendx to the trusted party, if needed).
(2) S receives the input x of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen .
(a) If x / ∈ X (this includes the case when x = ⊥ since A aborts), then S hands ⊥ to A as its output from the computation of ShareGen , sendsx to the trusted party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. (b) Otherwise, if the input is some x ∈ X , then S chooses uniformly distributed shares a
m and b
m . Then, S gives these shares to A as its output from the computation of ShareGen . (3) If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGen , then S sendsx to the trusted party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. Otherwise (i.e., if A sends continue), S proceeds as follows. (4) Choose i * according to a geometric distribution with parameter α. We now branch depending on the value of x.
i ⊕ 1 and gives a
i to A. (Recall that f (x 3 , y) = 1 for any y.) (b) If A aborts and i ≤ i * , then S sendsx to the trusted party computing f . If A aborts and i > i * then S sends x = x 3 to the trusted party computing f . In either case, S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If A does not abort, then S proceeds to the next iteration. (6) If S has not halted yet, then if i * ≤ m it sends x 3 to the trusted party computing f while if i * > m it sendsx. Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
If x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 }:
(7) Letx be the "other" value in {x 1 , x 2 }; that is, if x = x c thenx = x 3−c . 6 To simplify readability later, we reserve x for the value input by A to the computation of ShareGen . (i) If a i = 0, then with probability 1/3 sendx to the trusted party computing f , and with probability 2/3 send x 3 . (ii) If a i = 1, then with probability 1/3 send x to the trusted party computing f ; with probability 1/2 sendx; and with probability 1/6 send x 3 . In either case, S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If A does not abort, then S proceeds. has not yet sent anything to the trusted party computing f (this can only happen if i * > m and A has never aborted), then it sendŝ x to the trusted party. Then S outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
We will show that the distribution generated by S in an ideal-world execution with a trusted party computing f is identical to the distribution in a hybrid execution between A and an honest P 2 . (As always, we are ignoring here the possibility that A can forge a valid MAC-tag; once again, this introduces only a negligible statistical difference.) We first observe that the case of x = x 3 is straightforward since in this case S does not need to send anything to the trusted party until after A aborts. (This is because a i = 1 for all i since f (x 3 , y) = 1 for all y ∈ Y ; note that this is the first time in the proof we rely on specific properties of f .) For the remainder of the proof, we therefore focus our attention on the case when x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 }.
Let VIEW hyb (x, y) be the random variable denoting the view of A in the hybrid world (i.e., running with a trusted party computing ShareGen ) when P 2 holds input y and A uses input x in the computation of ShareGen . Let VIEW ideal (x, y) be the random variable denoting the view of A in the ideal world (i.e., where S runs A as a black-box and interacts with a trusted party computing f ) with x, y similarly defined. Finally, let OUT hyb (x, y), OUT ideal (x, y) be random variables denoting the output of the honest player P 2 in the hybrid and ideal worlds, respectively, for the given x and y. We will show that for any x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 } and y ∈ Y ,
(We stress that the above assumes A never forges a valid MAC-tag, and therefore the security parameter n can be ignored and perfect equivalence obtained. Taking the possibility of a forged MAC-tag into account, these distributions would then have statistical difference negligible in the security parameter n.) It is immediate from the description of S that VIEW hyb (x, y) ≡ VIEW ideal (x, y) for any x, y; the difficulty lies in arguing about the joint distribution of A's view and P 2 's output, as discussed previously. We prove Eq. (2) by showing that for any x, y as discussed previously and any view v and bit b , it holds that: i but we equivalently consider the reconstructed values a 1 , . . . , a i instead.) Looking at the description of S, it is easy to see that if v represents a view in which A aborts before the first iteration, or in which A never aborts (i.e., A runs the protocol to completion), then Eq. (3) holds for either choice of b . Thus, the "difficult" cases to analyze are exactly those in which A aborts in some iteration i.
Let v be a view in which A aborts in iteration i (i.e., after receiving its iteration-i message). We will let A's initial inputs and its outputs from ShareGen be implicit, and focus on the vector of values a i = (a 1 , . . . , a i ) that A sees before it aborts in iteration i, We will show that for any x, y as described previously, any a i , and any bit b it holds that
We stress that we are considering exactly those views a i = (a 1 , . . . , a i ) in which A aborts after receiving its iteration-i message; there is thus no possibility that A might abort given the sequence of values a 1 , . . . , a j (with j < i). Toward proving Eq. (4), we first prove the following claim.
CLAIM 5. For any x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 } and y ∈ Y,
PROOF. A proof of this claim follows easily from the observation that, conditioned on i * < i, the "true" input of P 1 is used to compute P 2 's output in both the hybrid and ideal worlds.
Formally, fix some x, y and let these be implicit in what follows. To prove the claim, note that
By description of S we have Pr VIEW hyb = a i i * < i = Pr VIEW ideal = a i i * < i . Furthermore, conditioned on i * < i the output of P 2 is the correct output f (x, y) in both the hybrid and ideal worlds. We conclude that Eq. (5) holds. To complete the proof of Eq. (4), we prove that for any x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 } and y ∈ Y , any a i ∈ {0, 1} i , and all b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that
This is the crux of the proof. Write a i = ( a i−1 , a) ,
(In what follows, we also often leave x and y implicit in the interests of readability.) Then
Once again, it follows readily from the description of S that
Moreover, conditioned on the event that i * ≥ i, the random variables of VIEW 
for all x, y, a, b as described previously. We prove this via case-by-case analysis. For convenience, we recall the table for f :
Case 1 (x = x 1 and y = y 1 ). We analyze the hybrid world first, followed by the ideal world.
Hybrid World. We first consider the hybrid world where the parties are running protocol . If A aborts after receiving its iteration-i message, P 2 will output OUT hyb = b i−1 . 
Putting everything together gives 
Ideal World. We now turn our attention to the ideal world. Since we are conditioning on i * ≥ i, here it is also the case that Pr[i
, y 1 ) = 0. Now, however, if i * = i then S has already sent x 1 to the trusted party computing f (in order to learn the value f (x 1 , y 1 )) and so P 2 will also output f (x 1 , y 1 ) = 0, rather than some independent (in calculating this, recall that x = x 1 ). Putting everything together, we obtain Similarly,
in exact agreement with Eq. (8).
Case 2 (x = x 2 and y = y 1 ). In all the remaining cases, the arguments are the same as before; just the numbers differ. Therefore, we will allow ourselves to be more laconic.
In the hybrid world, conditioned on i 
In the ideal world, if i (using the fact that x = x 2 ). Putting everything together, we obtain
in exact agreement with Eq. (13).
Case 3 (x = x 1 and y = y 2 ). In the hybrid world, this case is exactly symmetric to the case when x = x 2 and y = y 1 . Thus, we obtain the same distribution as in Eq. (13).
In the ideal world, if i (using the fact that x = x 1 ). Putting everything together, we obtain the same distribution as in Eqs. (14)- (17). The distributions in the hybrid and ideal worlds are, once again, in exact agreement.
Case 4 (x = x 2 and y = y 2 ). In the hybrid world, this case is exactly symmetric to the case when x = x 1 and y = y 1 . Thus, we obtain the same distribution as in Eq. (8).
In the ideal world, if i rely on the same intuition.) A i1 chooses a random input x ∈ {x 0 , x 1 } and runs the protocol honestly for i − 1 rounds. It then computes the value it would output if B aborted the protocol at the current point, that is, it computes a i . If a i = 1, then A i1 continues the protocol for one more round (hoping that this will cause B to output 1 also) and halts. If a i = 0, then A i1 halts immediately (hoping that B's output does not yet "match" A i1 's, and that B will still output 1). In addition to this behavior during the protocol, A i1 also guesses B's input, in the natural way, based on its own input value x and the value of a i it computed. In particular, if x = x σ , then A i1 guesses that B's input is y a i ⊕σ (since f (x σ , y a i ⊕σ ) = a i ). Say B's input is y. Intuitively, because the protocol is completely fair, if the output that A i1 computes in round i is biased toward the correct value of f (x, y), it must be that the last message sent by A i1 has relatively limited relevance (i.e., that B would output the same bit whether A i1 sends its ith round message or not). In particular, in the case of A r1 , the computed output must be equal to f (x, y) (with all but negligible probability), and therefore the last message of the protocol is, in some sense, unnecessary. Using induction (for a logarithmic number of steps), we will demonstrate that the same holds for each of the prior rounds, and conclude that a protocol running in O(log n) rounds can be transformed into an empty protocol in which neither party sends anything. This is, of course, impossible; therefore, no such protocol exists.
We now formally describe the adversaries. Success probability for A i 1 . As preparation for the proof that follows, we calculate the probability that A i1 succeeds in simultaneously guessing B's input y correctly, and having B output 1. By construction, if (say) A i1 uses x = x 0 as input and obtains a i = 0, then it guesses correctly iff y = y 0 . Furthermore, since it received a i = 0 it does not send its ith round message; thus, by our notation, B outputs 1 if b i−1 = 1. There are three other possible ways for this to occur as well:
The calculations are similar for A i0 , B i1 , and B i0 so we present them with no further explanation. 
The Proof
We begin by showing that, in the ideal model, it is impossible for an adversary to bias the output of the honest party while simultaneously guessing the honest party's input, with probability greater than 1/2. Note that an adversary can certainly do one or the other. For example, if the honest B uses input y ∈ R {y 0 , y 1 } and an adversarial A uses input x 0 , then A learns the input of B (by observing if the output is 0 or 1). Furthermore, if there exists a value x for which f (x , y 0 ) = f (x , y 1 ) = 1, then A can completely 
for sufficiently large n and all 1 ≤ i ≤ r(n). We now prove a claim that states, informally, that if both parties can compute the correct output with high probability after running i rounds of , then they can also compute the correct output with high probability even when B does not send its ithround message. The first four equations represent the probability with which both parties receive correct output after executing the first i rounds of (i.e., after B sends its message in round i), for all possible choices of their inputs. The last four equations consider the same event, but when B does not send its message in round i. The claim asserts that the fact that B does not send its message in round i has a limited effect on the probability with which the parties obtain correct outputs. 
We also have Using a symmetric argument, we can similarly prove Eq. (27). Using an exactly analogous argument, but with adversary B i1 in place of B i0 , we can prove Eqs. (28) and (29).
The proof of the following claim exactly parallels the proof of the preceding claim, but using adversaries A i0 and A i1 instead of adversaries B i0 and B i1 . We now prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.1. Let f be a two-party function containing an embedded XOR. Then any protocol securely computing f with complete fairness (assuming one exists) requires ω(log n) rounds.
PROOF. Let
be a protocol computing f with complete fairness using r = r(n) rounds. Set μ = 1/poly(n) for some polynomial to be fixed later. By correctness of , we have that for n sufficiently large If r = O(log n), then p(n) def = 4 2r(n) is polynomial. Taking μ(n) = 1/16 p(n) implies that, for n sufficiently large, A and B can both correctly compute (with probability at least 3/4) the value f (x, y), for all x ∈ {x 0 , x 1 } and y ∈ {y 0 , y 1 }, without any interaction at all. This is impossible, and so we conclude that r = ω(log n).
